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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION

It is important to note that the Montgomerys never properly address the majority
of Hardy's argument contained in his brief. The Montgomerys do not distinguish any of
the case law Hardy sets forth in his brief. The Montgomerys also engage in logical
fallacies by making ad hominem attacks not relevant to this matter. Since the
Montgomerys refuse to address the majority of Hardy's arguments, the appropriate
conclusion is the Montgomerys have resigned that Hardy is entitled to prevail on the
issues he sets forth in his brief. Instead of explaining why Hardy's argument and case
law should not be applied, the Montgomerys try to develop new arguments they did not
assert at the trial level. The new arguments made by the Montgomerys set forth contrary
ideas like testimony should trump the language of the contract and the parties
renegotiated terms of the contract. These are inconsistent with the lower court's findings.
These new arguments are also inconsistent with the Montgomerys position that the
parties' agreement is fully integrated-including the REPC. [R. 379 ,I3]
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND NON-WAIVER CLAUSE OF THE LEASE
i..:J

AGREEMENT
A. The Standard of Review of a Contract is a Question of Law.
One of the fundamental problems with the Montgomerys' argument is they are
asking this court to enforce the parties' contract based on selective reading and their word
rather than the plain language of the contract. The Montgomerys are asking the Court to
find certain terms of the contract to be treated as a question of fact, which defeats the

5
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purpose of any party entering into a written contract especially since any party can later
claim terms that are more favorable to their interests. "As a consequence of an
integration clause, a court must first look to the written contract alone to determine its
meaning and the intent of the contracting parties." Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App.
137 P7, 234 P.3d 1156 (Utah ;\pp. 2010). The standard of review for a contract is a
question of law reviewed for correctness on the proper interpretation and application.
Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, ,r 16, 30 P. 3d 436. If the Montgomerys disagree with
this standard of review the Montgomerys should explain when and where the lower court
made a finding that the contract is facially ambiguous on the issues they claim should be
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. This would be impossible as the lower
court never made such a finding that any of the provisions of the contract were
ambiguous.

"Where the language is unambiguous, 'the parties' intentions are

determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be

interpreted as a matter of law." Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App. 137 P7, 234 P.3d 1156
(Utah App. 2010) (citing Glenn 2009 UT 80, PIO, 225 P.3d 185 quoting Cafe Rio, Inc. v.
Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, P 25,207 P.3d 1235. The Montgomerys
propose that the contract should be evaluated by the clearly erroneous standard as
question of fact. The proposal by the Montgomerys would destroy the very purpose of a
written contract. Essential the Montgomerys are stating that the lower court should
engage in "factual findings" even when the contract specifically set out the standard the
court should follow. Unfortunately for whatever reason, the lower court did not apply a
substantial amount of the parties' contract. The lower court also did not provide any
6
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reason as to why these sections of the contract were omitted, however, the record shows
~

the court believed the parties' agreement to be integrated. [R.38215] The
Montgomerys' suggestion that the lower court be enabled to ignore the plain language of
the parties' contract to find facts according to whatever the Montgomerys testified
advocates that it is appropriate for the lower court to step in and renegotiate the contract
of the parties. The Supreme Court has issued a strong statement against such fact finding
endeavors, "It is not our prerogative to step in and renegotiate the contract of the parties."
See Commercial Real Estate Inv. V. Comcast of Utah IL Inc. 2012 UT 49138, 285 P.3d
1193, 1202 (quoting Peckv. Judd, 1 Utah 2d 420,326 P.2d 712, 717 (Utah 1958). Any
of the "findings of fact" of the lower court that conflict with the parties agreement should
be held to the standard of review of whether the lower court correctly applied the terms of
the contract, especially since the lower court did not ever make a finding that the terms of
the contract were "facially ambiguous." "Before the court may consider extrinsic
evidence of the parties' intent, however, it must first conclude that the contract is facially
ambiguous. Although the court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether
the contract is facially ambiguous, that evidence may not be used to contradict the
plain language of the contract." Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App. 137 P 8,234 P.3d

1156 (Utah App. 2010). (emphasis added) One of the main reasons for Hardy's appeal
~

was to finally have accountability and an explanation as to why many of the terms of the
contract were not applied by the lower court.
B. The Failure to Apply the Non-Waiver Clause and Termination of the
Lease Should Be Reviewed for Correctness On Proper Application.
7
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One example where this court should review the correctness of application rather
than the clearly erroneous standard is the non-waiver provision. Since the lower court
never applied the non-waiver provision of the lease agreement, nor gave any finding that
the non-waiver clause should not be enforced, the standard of review is appropriately one
~

of "correctness on the proper interpretation and application." [R. 380 ,r 4; Lease
Agreement attached to Addendum of Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1" ,r 30] The
Non-Waiver in effect states the parties' agreed that even if Hardy did not exercise a right
under the agreement, it did not stop Hardy from later enforcing that right. Id. It is
important to remember the admonition of the Court in Wilson, evidence may not be used
to contradict the plain language of the contract." Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App.

137 P 8,234 P.3d 1156 (Utah App. 2010). (emphasis added) The lower court
unfortunately does exactly what the Court says not to do and applies evidence (presented
by the Montgomery's) that Hardy did not explicitly enforce his right to collect additional
rent owed to him to find Hardy waived his right to collect this rent. [R. 380

,r 4]

The

lower court states, ... The Montgomerys made each rental payment, all in the amount of
$700.00, directly to Hardy. Hardy never told the Montgomerys that the rental payment
was in the wrong amount" ... in a letter ''there is no demand for the additional $100.00 per
month" This finding directly contradicts the language of the non-waiver clause, which
states, NON-WAIVER. No indulgence, waiver, election or non-election by Landlord
under this Agreement shall affect Tenant's duties and liabilities hereunder. No failure of
Landlord to enforce any term hereof shall be deemed a waiver, nor shall any acceptance
of a partial payment of rent be deemed a waiver of Landlord's right to the full amount

8
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~

thereof... " Lease Agreement attached to Addendum of Appellant's Brief as "Trial
Exhibit I" ,r 30] The fact that the lower court finds acceptance of partial payment, or that
Hardy did not to enforce the term of additional rent at the time as justification to find
Hardy waived this right directly contradicts the language of the parties' agreement.
The Montgomerys in their assertion of waiver being reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard do not make any effort to dispute or distinguish Hardy's case law
from his brief. The fact that the Supreme Court of Utah stated, "With this legal
requirement we ensured that waiver would not be found from any particular set of facts
unless it was clearly intended.. .Consistent with this point is the general principle in our

case law that "mere silence is not a waiver unless tliere is some duty or obligation to
speak." Soter 's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 citing Plateau
Mining Co., 802 P.2d at 730, quoted in Rees, 808 P.2d at 1073. (emphasis added) Since

the non-waiver clause specifically excuses Hardy from any duty or obligation to speak,
Hardy's silence in a phone conversation or a letter asking the Montgomerys to comply
cannot be held as clear intent for Hardy to waive his right of additional rents. Again the
lower court's facts cannot be used to negate the clear language of the parties' agreement.
Given the legal standard of a clear intent, and the lower court used bad case law with
regards to waiver to make its determination, even under a clearly erroneous standard, the
facts show Hardy did not clearly intend to waive his right to collect the additional rents
by his "mere silence," but rather relied on the language of the non-waiver clause to
preserve all of his rights.

9
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~

In a related issue that the lower court likely erred by using evidence to contradict
the plain language of the contract is when it failed to apply the Tenant's Hold Over
clause. The lower court's calculation of rents, additional rent, late fees and damages, was
based on a number in which the Montgomery's were liable only for half of February's
rent. [R. 3 84 ,I2] The lower court created significant problems by ruling the
Montgomerys phone call was sufficient to terminate their obligation to pay rent, despite
the lease agreement specifically saying only prior written consent would be sufficient
notice. [R. 377,I 14; 378 ,I22-23; 384 il 2; Lease Agreement attached to Addendum of
Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1" il 15] In addition, the Montgomerys admit that
they resided "at the Plaintifr s property through March 2014 when they filed their
DEFENDANTS' COUNTER-MOTION FOR Sillvflv1ARY JUDGMENT ON
PLANTIFF'S FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION." [R.86 iJ 3]. The lower
court then found Hardy was responsible for his part of the obligation through April which
the court found was the end of the lease period. [R. 3 82 1 6] Since 1. the Montgomerys
testimony conflicts with their pleadings, 2. the lower court did not apply the lease
agreement language requiring written notice, and 3. the court also found the lease ran
through April, the obligation of the parties' should be reciprocal, meaning if the lease ran
through April, the Montgomerys should be responsible for all rents, late fees, and
damages through April. [R. 378 ,I23, 384 ,I2; Lease Agreement attached to Addendum
of Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1 at ,I15] Hardy respectfully asks that the rents,
late fees, and damages be corrected to reflect the terms of the contract, the court's finding
of the termination of the lease, and the Montgomerys' pleading.

10
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~

C. Application of the Non-Waiver and Tenant's Hold Over Clauses Makes it
Necessary to Recalculate Hardy's Entitled Payment Including Late Fees
and Damages.
~

Since Hardy did not waive his right to additional rents, Hardy is entitled to late
fees accruing in May because the Montgomerys could not have paid rent on time when
they failed to pay the full amount of rent owed. The month of May should also trigger a
late payment fee of 10% the total monthly installment, which was $800.00 not $700.00
as the lower court implies. [Lease Agreement attached to Addendum of Appellant's Brief
as "Trial Exhibit 1 at ,I2] (emphasis added) Since the Montgomery's never paid the full
amount of rent for any month, late fees should be incurred for every month of the term of
the lease-through April at the correct amount as stated in the contract of 10% the total
monthly installment. Additionally since the Montgomerys were late with the May
payment by failing to pay the full amount, damages of $10.00/per day should be

~

calculated beginning in May as well.

D. The Montgomery's are Responsible for the Parties Contract as a Result of
Their Rejection by Counter Offer.
~

Finally, the Montgomerys assert, similar to the lower court, that the contract should be
construed against the drafter, implying there should be some additional benefit to the
Montgomery's or detriment to Hardy. Citing Parks Enterprises, Inc., v. New Century
Realty, 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982) (Note in Parks the court found the seller's typed
addition to the earnest money agreement was a counteroffer.) First the Montgomerys do
not explain why the contract being construed against the drafter merits a finding of the
11
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contract to be ambiguous. The lower court however implies the contract is not
ambiguous since it states, the REPC is integrated, and "the court cannot arbitrarily ignore
the plain language of paragraph 36." [R. 379-378 ,I3] While the contract being construed
against the drafter does not follow to the logical conclusion that the contract is ambiguous
to merit a different standard of review, it is important to note that the lower court and the
Montgomerys come to the wrong conclusion that Hardy is the drafter of the contract. It
was the Montgomerys who proposed to Hardy that they cross out the dog provision of the
contract. (R. 445: 19-25, 446:1-9; 450:1-8). The mirror image rule requires that Hardy's
offer be accepted exactly as it was presented to the Montgomerys with no modifications.
"An acceptance must unconditionally assent to all material terms presented in the offer,
including price and method of performance, or it is a rejection of the offer." Cal
Wadsworth Constr. V. City ofSt. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995). Hardy
presented his offer of the contract with paragraph 17 Animals; Smoking provision intact.
The Montgomerys then asked Hardy to cross out that provision. [R. 445: 23-25; 446:112] The animal's provision would have resulted in Hardy receiving $300.00 and an
increase of rent of $150.00 more per month due to the Montgomerys having dogs. [Lease
Agreement attached to Addendum of Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1 at ,Il 7] The
change of the offer by the Montgomerys clearly changes the price of the agreement.
"When an offeree responds to an offer with a proposal of different terms from those of
the offer, the offeree has made a counteroffer, and no contract arises unless the original
offeror accepts the counteroffer unconditionally." Verdi Engery Group, Inc. v. Nelson,
2014 UT App 101 ,I15, 326 P.3d 104. (See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §36)
12
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Since the Montgomerys made a modification to the lease agreement, the Montgomerys
~

are therefore the new drafters of the contract as they did not accept Hardy's offer as
presented and in tum made a counter-offer that Hardy accepted. If the contract is to be

~

construed against the drafter, it must be construed against the Montgomerys who were
responsible for the agreement the parties signed by way of their rejection of terms and
counteroffer with new terms.
HARDY HAS MAINTAINED THE APPLICATION OF THE REPC STILL
ENTITLES HARDY TO THE OPTION PAYl\1ENT.
A. The REPC instructs Hardy to terminate the REPC and Keep the Option
Payment as Liquidated Damages.

The Montgomerys assert in their brief, and the lower court found, the REPC to be
integrated part of the lease agreement. [R. 382 ,r 5] The lower court also found that the
Montgomerys were in default of the parties' agreement by failing to pay rent on time, late
fees, and damages. "It could be argued that the option terminated upon the Montgomerys
default. But a default only suspends the non-defaulting party's performance ... " [R. 382383 ,r 6]. The lower court and the Montgomerys then assert that despite the
Montgomerys default, and Hardy's obligation being suspended, Hardy repudiated on the
REPC by refusing to sell the property and this repudiation resulted in Hardy being
unjustly enriched. Id
The lower court found unjust enrichment because "It would be inequitable for
Hardy to keep the full amount, having foreclosed the Montgomerys exercise of the
option by his repudiation." [R. 383-384 ,r 1]
13
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and the REPC granted Hardy the right to terminate the agreement upon the Montgomerys
default. [Lease Agreement attached to Addendum of Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit
1 at

tJ 20 REPC 1

16.1] Specifically, the language of the REPC in paragraph 16.1

states, "If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect one of the following remedies: (a) cancel
the REPC and retain the Earnest Money Deposit, or Deposits, if applicable, as
liquidated damages; ... " Id. (emphasis added) The lower court makes it clear that it
found the Montgomerys had defaulted on a variety of obligations under the agreement at
the time of Hardy's refusal to finance the purchase of the home. [R.382-38316] Hardy
~

cannot be found to have repudiated on the REPC by refusing to sell the property when the
REPC itself states that Hardy should act exactly as he did. Hardy chose to terminate the
REPC and keep the $7,000.00 option payment/Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated
damages. Since the REPC and the lease agreement allows Hardy to "foreclose the
Montgomerys exercise of the option," by terminating the agreement, Hardy cannot be
found to have repudiated the option. [Lease Agreement attached to Addendum of
Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1 at REPC tJ 16.1] Since Hardy didn't repudiate on the
option based on the parties' own agreement, the lower court is incorrect to find unjust
enrichment because Hardy did exactly what the parties agreed he should do.
Additionally, the Montgomerys have not asserted that the terms of the REPC are
unjust, rather they argue the REPC is what this and the lower court should follow. The
lower court did not find the terms of the REPC to be unjust stating the Montgomerys had
~

the right to " ... exercise the option and purchase the house pursuant to the REPC." The

14

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

REPC is clearly the document the lower court uses to justify a finding of Hardy's

~

repudiation. [R. 3 82 ,r 6] The lower court has given no explanation as to why paragraph
16.1 of the REPC should not be applied. The lower court did however state, "the Lease is
silent as to the right to cure the default." The lower court clearly did not apply the lease
or the REPC which both documents gave Hardy the right to terminate both parts of the
agreement as a result of the Montgomerys default. [Lease Agreement attached to
Addendum of Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1 at

if 2, 20 and REPC ,r

16.1] If the

REPC is to be applied as the lower court and the Montgomerys insist, equity demands
that all the provisions be given effect, including Hardy's right to cancel the REPC and
retain his liquidated damages as a result of the Montgomerys default.
The Montgomerys do not dispute their default, but rather claim Hardy repudiated
by refusing to sell the property justifying the application of paragraph 16.2 of the REPC,
without any mention of paragraph 16.1. This intentional omission further illustrates the
bad faith and conscientious decision of the Montgomerys to mislead this Court. Surely
the Montgomerys are aware of paragraph 16.1 since it precedes 16.2 which they cite in
their brief. See Utah Rules ofProfessional Conduct R.: 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 8.4. The fact
that the Montgomerys do not provide any explanation as to why paragraph 16.1 should
not have effect only strengthens the argument that the Montgomerys are trying to engage
Lr)

in selective reading of the parties' agreement. If the REPC should be applied, especially
since the Montgomerys are trying to invoke paragraph 16.2 as binding between the
parties, then this Court must correctly apply the REPC. Hardy did not repudiate on the

15
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REPC because the REPC specifically instructs Hardy to cancel the REPC and keep the
non-refundable $7,000.00 as liquidated damages upon the Montgomery's default.
B. Under Utah Law Liquidated Damages are Presumed Enforceable.

The Montgomerys and lower court argue that the REPC is binding on the parties,
and that Hardy committed an anticipatory and material breach of the REPC by refusing to
sell the property resulting in his unjust enrichment. The Montgomerys assert that some
form of equity requires the $7,000.00 to be refunded. This is not consistent however with
the lease agreement stating it is non-refundable nor is it compatible with the liquidated
damages clause contained in the REPC which clearly states, Hardy (seller) may "cancel
the REPC and retain the Earnest Money Deposit, or Deposits, if applicable, as liquidated
damages; ... " [Lease Agreement attached to Addendum of Appellant's Brief as "Trial
Exhibit 1 at

,r 2, 20 and REPC ,r

16.1]

The Supreme Court of Utah had this to say

about liquidated damages, "It is not our prerogative to step in and renegotiate the contract
of the parties." See Commercial Real Estate Inv. V. Comcast of Utah IL Inc. 2012 UT 49

if 38,

285 P.3d 1193, 1202 (quoting Peck v. Judd, 1 Utah 2d 420, 326 P.2d 712, 717

(Utah 1958). If the lower court is correct in applying the REPC than the $7,000.00
option payment should be deemed enforceable as the REPC calls for the amount to be
given to Hardy as liquidated damages. "Thus we clarify that liquidated damages clauses
are not subject to any form of heightened judicial scrutiny. Instead, courts should begin
with the longstanding presumption that liquidated damages clauses are enforceable."

Commercial Real Estate Inv. V. Comcast of Utah IL Inc. 2012 UT 49140, 285 P.3d
1193, 1203 (Citing) see Bair, 2001 UT 20, 125, 20 P.3d 388 Since the liquidated
16
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damages provision of the REPC 16.1 states that Hardy is entitled to keeping the Earnest
Money Deposit of$7,000.00, then the lower court erred in refunding it to the
Montgomerys.
The fact the Montgomerys claim the retention of the liquidated damages is unfair
is not enough to overturn the presumption that the liquidated damages clause is
unenforceable. The lower court was incorrect in determining that the retention of the
$7,000.00 would be inequitable as the Court in Commercial Real Estate makes very clear
that "Persons dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms without
\ifP

the intervention of the courts for the purpose of relieving one side or the other from the
effects of a bad bargain.'' Similarly the Montgomerys now argue that the non-refundable
$7,000.00 somehow is a bad bargain and equity requires it to be refunded despite the

vi

obvious language of the parties' agreement. A bad bargain is different than one that is
unconscionable. Neither the Montgomerys nor the lower court ever state that the
agreement was unconscionable, only that Hardy's enforcement of the agreement based on
the Montgomery's default seemed to result in a bad bargain for the Montgomerys.
There is nothing to support that Hardy retaining the $7,000.00 is unconscionable.
No finding of procedural unconscionability is supported to negate the liquidated damages
clause. The Montgomerys crossed out the dog's provision of the lease agreement that
would have resulted in a benefit to Hardy. [R. 445: 19-25, 446:1-9; 450:1-8]. They held
an adequate position to negotiate the terms of the agreement. The Montgomerys also
cannot claim Substantive unconscionability since, "It is not sufficient for the liquidated
damages clause to be "unreasonable or more advantageous to one party." See
17
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Commercial Real Estate Inv. V. Comcast of Utah II, Inc. 2012 UT 49 ,I 38, 285 P.3d

1193, 1202 (quoting Ryan, 972 P.2d at 402). At the time of the contract Hardy had an
obligation to not seek other buyers for his home and have the house for the Montgomerys
to live in for the length of the lease, and apply the $7,000.00 to the purchase price of the
home. [Lease Agreement attached to Addendum of Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1
at ,I 36]

The Court in Commercial Real Estate explains the proper evaluation for

unconscionability: "Although Comcast now argues that over $1. 7 million in liquidated
damages is "grossly disproportionate" to CRE's actual damages, this type of post hoc
weighing does not bear on the question of substantive unconscionability, which focuses
on the "relative fairness of the obligations assumed" at the time of contracting."

The

terms in the lease agreement in this case were fair as all the Montgomerys had to do was
comply with the terms of the agreement, state they wanted to exercise the option and the
$7,000.00 would have applied to the purchase price of the home. [Lease Agreement
attached to Addendum of Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1 at ,I 36]

Similarly to the

Court's findings in Commercial Real Estate, it "appears is that" the Montgomerys
"overobligated themselves and perhaps made an improvident bargain." The
Montgomerys either consciously or through failure to comply with the terms of the
agreement decided they did not want to exercise the option. Hardy should not be
required to refund the non-refundable $7,000.00 because the Montgomerys have buyer's
remorse with the parties' agreement. Both the lease agreement and the REPC are explicit
that the $7,000.00 is non-refundable.

18
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The option payment being treated as liquidated damages is consistent with Hardy's
position that the option money be retained by Hardy as consideration paid to Hardy for
holding the property for the Montgomerys and not seeking out other buyers.
~

Again the

Supreme Court of Utah on liquidated damages states, "noting the burden is on the party
seeking to invalidate a liquidated damages clause ... the burden properly rests on the party
challenging the clause's enforceability because "the purpose of a liquidated damages
provision is to obviate the need for the nonbreaching party to prove actual damages." Id.
Similarly, consideration for an option represents the parties bargained for estimate of the
detriment to the optionor (Hardy) to hold the property for the optionee (Montgomerys) to
purchase. Whether the $7,000.00 is called liquidated damages or consideration for an
option, the Montgomerys clearly received the benefit of having the property held for
them to purchase when they were told as much by Hardy in writing in September of 2013
despite their default. The Montgomerys continued to live in the property without paying
rent well beyond the term of the lease. The lower court agreed by finding, "Of course,
the house was off the market for the period of time that the Montgomerys occupied the
house ... " [R. 3 811 2 ] This clearly shows Hardy incurred the very detriment the parties
anticipated he would by holding the property for the Montgomerys to buy it. Similar to
the Court finding on liquidated damages, the option provision is to avoid the need for
Hardy to show the detriment he incurred as a result of holding the property for the
Montgomerys to purchase it. If the option were treated differently than it would require
Hardy, as the lower court suggests, to provide evidence that he breached the option
contract by seeking out other buyers. The fact that Hardy tried to work with the
19
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Montgomerys to allow them to purchase his house while they continually failed to fulfill
their obligations of the lease agreement should not be reason to punish Hardy and deny
him what the parties contractually agreed he receive.
Therefore based on the lease agreement or the REPC, the lower court's decision to
refund the $7,000.00 to the Montgomerys should be reversed, and a judgment entered
with Hardy being entitled to keep the option payment as stated in the REPC as a remedy
for the Montgomerys default(s).
THE MONTGOMERYS DO NOT EXPLAIN HOW FORFEITURE OF THE
LEASE APPLIES WHEN THEY STAYED AT THE PROPERTY FOR THE
DURATION WITHOUT SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLYING WITH THE
AGREEMENT
The Montgomerys argue that "courts have routinely granted relief from forfeiture
in the case of a breach of covenant to pay rent ... where the tenant stands ready to correct
his default." Housing Authority v. Delgado, 914 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1996) citing 49 Am.
Jur. 2d Landlord & Tenant §342 (1995) The Montgomerys do not show any evidence,
they "stood ready to correct his (their) default," which is why Hardy brought this suit.
The Montgomerys do not assert under their claimed doctrine of substantial compliance
that they were actually substantially in compliance with the lease agreement. The facts of
the case show they were not in compliance and they were never standing "ready to
correct his (their) default." [R. 382-383 ,I 6]
Further, the Montgomerys confuse rent with the option payment. Under the terms
the parties agreed to, Hardy was entitled to the option payment and the rent payment.
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[Lease Agreement attached to Addendum of Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1 at ,I 2,
19,36] The Montgomerys try to employ the fallacy of the false dilemma here and imply
Hardy should choose rent or the option payment but cannot expect both. The lower court
VP

also used this fallacy. The lease agreement was to benefit Hardy based on the time the
Montgomerys were at the property in an amount of $15,800.00 without including late
fees or damages. Instead the lower court reduced this amount by $7,000, applied it to

~

rents which resulted in Hardy having a liability of$1,990.00. Hardy is not in
substantially the same position he would have been in because he lost the value of being
able to sell his home while the Montgomerys lived there and also lost full amount of rents
owed. This is hardly equitable or consistent with contract law principles as Hardy
suffered the detriment of the Montgomerys living in his house while Hardy was unable to
sell the property due to them living there.
The Montgomerys argue that equity pursuant to well-established Utah law, that a
late rent payment does not justify forfeiture of $7,000.00 earnest money deposit, but do
not cite any specific case law for this conclusion. The Montgomerys pretend that
everyone will forget it was more than one late rent payment, i.e. they never paid the full

~

amount of rent, late fees, or damages. [R. 382-383 ,I 6]

The Montgomerys also fail to

mention that Utah law also respects parties' ability to contract with each other. The
Supreme Court of Utah has stated, "we should recognize and honor the right of the
persons to contract freely and to make real and genuine mistakes when the dealings are at
arms' length. Courts' ... should not interfere." See Commercial Real Estate Inv. V.
Comcast of Utah IL Inc. 2012 UT 49 ,I 38, 285 P.3d 1193, 1202 (quoting Peck v. Judd, 7

~
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Utah 2d 420, 326 P.2d 712, 717 (Utah 1958). Whether it's the lease agreement or the
REPC, both documents provide Hardy with the option to terminate the agreement in the
event of the Montgomery's default. Equity holds that it is not fair to Hardy to lose a
benefit because the Montgomery's refused to fulfill their obligations of the parties'
agreement and now want a refund of the option because they didn't live up to their
bargain.
CONCLUSION

Hardy respectfully requests that the lower court's decision be reversed in that the
lower court did not follow the terms of the contracts of the parties. Hardy should be
entitled to keep the $7,000.00 option payment, collect additional rents of $100.00 for the
entire lease agreement, collect late fees for every month of the lease since the
Montgomery's never paid the full installment amount of $800.00 on time, collect late
fees of 10% the full monthly installment based on $800.00 rather than $700.00, collect
liquidated damages of $10.00/day starting in May 2013 through April 2014 for the entire
term of the lease due to the Montgomery's failure to pay full rent on time, and be
awarded his attorney's fees [Lease Agreement attached to Addendum of Appellant's
Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1 at

,r 23] for the entire matter including having to bring this

matter before the lower court and court of appeals to enforce the terms of the parties'
agreement.
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DATED this 17th day of January, 2017.

Isl Tyler Woodworth
Tyler A. Woodworth, Esq.
Attorney for the Appellant
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